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1 Introduction
“In principle, anyone can trade in the carbon market.”1
This quote describes who can trade in the European Union Emissions Trading System
(EU ETS). It is asked here whether the “number” anyone is too large. To answer this
question, the model of this study is framed as a welfare comparison of prices and quan-
tities with multiple time periods. The feature that differentiates this model from those
in the literature including for example Finkelsthain and Kislev (1997), Montero (2002),
Newell and Pizer (2003), Baldursson and von der Fehr (2004) and Karp and Zhang (2012)
is that the consequences of certain types of perturbations in the permit market are mod-
eled (e.g., trades by unregulated non-polluting participants). In the models that study
emissions trading, the market clearing condition is simply one where the number of per-
mits distributed meets the regulated firms’ demand. But since anyone can trade in the
EU ETS, the aggregate demand of permits at some period of time may not equal to the
aggregate demand of the regulated firms. Banks, other investors and organizations, for
example, may buy and sell permits; therefore, one period may see greater demand for
permits and another, an additional supply of permits. This may change the equilibrium
price of permits such that the price differs from the tax rate, and in effect, the welfare
ordering of the instruments in a multi-period model may change.
As a benchmark, consider the first-best allocation in which the regulator maximizes
social welfare defined as the difference between the profits and damages from pollution
by choosing the instruments (that is, the tax level or the amount of auctioned permits).
Suppose that a perturbation occurs in the permit market.2 It is intuitive in this case that
tax dominates emissions trading: The perturbation induces a change in the permit price
from its first-best value, which itself affects the amount of emissions the firms produce.
Hence the allocation fails to maximize welfare. But the tax rate is fixed and is unaffected
by the perturbation, which consequently leads to a welfare-maximizing emissions level.
In the first-best model the number anyone is too large.
Although it represents an interesting starting point with a clear intuition, the first-best
choice of the instruments leaves out political considerations. These are important since in
practice the instrument levels are chosen in some kind of political process. Therefore the
purpose of this study is to analyze the same question in a setting where the instruments
are chosen through a political process, which implies that the instruments are no longer
first-best. To describe the political process, the model of Finkelsthain and Kislev (1997)
is used.3
It is shown that if the social welfare function is strictly concave with respect to emission
price and if the perturbations in the permit market produce equilibrium prices that are
symmetrical around the emission tax, then the welfare level will be higher with the
emission tax than with emissions trading. However, the welfare ranking of the instruments
becomes ambiguous in general, and the ranking may even reverse in favor of emissions
trading. Indeed, not all perturbations are bad for emissions trading: For example, as the
1A quote from European Commission’s EU ETS-website, European Commission (2016). Emphasis is
added.
2Perturbation could be for example a trade by citizens or by an NGO, or “speculation” in general.
For example, speculation in the emissions trading market tends to affect the equilibrium permit price
(Colla et al., 2012).
3Their model is based on Grossman and Helpman (1994), which is a much-used model also in environ-
mental and resource economics. Examples include Finkelsthain and Kislev (1997), Fredriksson (1997),
Aidt (1998) and Kawahara (2014).
instruments produce the same emissions level without perturbations, it is possible that
emissions trading with perturbations yields a higher welfare level than the tax would; this
happens when the perturbation leads to emissions that are slightly closer to the first-best
emissions level than the emissions level with the tax. If the perturbations push emissions
in the other direction, then the tax dominates.
The next section continues with the description of the assumptions, Section 3 presents
the results, and the last section discusses the model.
2 Modeling perturbations
A fixed number of firms are indexed with i, i = 1, . . . , N , and are regulated either by an
emission tax or emissions trading. Time is indexed with τ , τ = 1, . . . , T . The emissions
level of firm i at period τ is denoted by eτi , and the aggregate emissions at period τ
are Eτ :=
∑N
i=1 e
τ
i .
4 The profit for firm i as a function of emissions, πi(e
τ
i ), satisfies
inequalities π′i > 0 and π
′′
i < 0 for every i, and the damage as a function of aggregate
emissions, D (Eτ ), satisfies inequalities D′ > 0 and D′′ > 0.5 The optimal choice of
emissions for firm i in any period τ as a function of the permit price p (or emission tax t)
is denoted by eτi (p). This is the unique amount of emissions that maximizes πi(e
τ
i )− pe
τ
i
and satisfies deτi /dp < 0. Let E
0,τ represent the total number of permits distributed in
period τ .
Let P ⊆ R++ be the set of possible emissions prices, and let Θ be a set that includes
the possible perturbations. Define demand function of permits M τ asM τ : P ×Θ→ R++
for any τ . The following assumption characterizes the market-clearing condition in the
permit market and the market-clearing permit price.
Assumption 1.
(i) (Market clearing) There exists for any τ and for any θ ∈ Θ a price p ∈ P such that
M τ (p, θ) = E0,τ . (1)
(ii) (Clearing price) Equation (1) defines for any τ the price as a one-to-one function
of θ, pτ : Θ→ P . Its value at θ is denoted by pτθ .
These assumptions can be interpreted as follows. The elements of Θ describe the
perturbations that can happen in the permit market. The content of parts (i) and (ii)
is only that some perturbation affects market clearing or price formation in the permit
market. In particular, the permit market clears in such a way that different perturbation
values yield different clearing prices. Define θ∗,τ as the value of θ that produces the price
without perturbations at period τ .
Example. The above situation leaves unspecified the elements of set Θ. For example,
let Θ := N0 = {0, 1, . . .}, and let θ represent the number of unregulated participants who
trade in the permit market. Then θ∗,τ := 0 and M τ (p, 0) :=
∑N
i=1 e
τ
i (p) for all τ . In this
case, the market-clearing condition can be expressed as
M τ (p, θ) :=
N∑
i=1
eτi (p) +
θ∑
j=1
dτj (p) = E
0,τ , (2)
4Superscript τ is used to denote time period.
5The analysis is simplified by assuming a flow pollutant. Also, the profit and damage functions are
assumed to be time invariant.
where dτj is the demand (or supply) function of an unregulated participant j at period τ .
3 Results
Next, the political process is briefly described in the current context.6 The model in this
section, which originates from Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Finkelsthain and Kislev
(1997), consist of three stages. First, the lobby group with L ≤ N firms decides its po-
litical contribution C, which is contingent on the instrument level of the regulator.7 In
the second stage, the regulator maximizes its utility, defined as a weighted combina-
tion of the aggregate social welfare (the difference between profits and damages) and
the contribution, by choosing the instrument.8 In the third stage, the firms choose their
optimal emissions individually and perturbations occur. However, the perturbations are
not expected by the regulator.
The analysis begins from the third stage. Here, the following equation describes the
firm’s choice:
π′i(ei) = k, (3)
in which k is the price of emissions. This price is either the tax t or the equilibrium permit
price p. Following Finkelsthain and Kislev (1997), in the second stage, the regulator
maximizes its utility under the constraint that the lobby group’s profit is greater than or
equal to the reservation profit Y . The weight is given by the parameter α > 0. Let ci be
firm i’s contribution or “political bribes”, and C =
∑L
i=1 ci. As in Finkelsthain and Kislev
(1997), the maximization problem for the regulator is, in the case of an emission tax,
max
{t}
{
N∑
i=1
πi(ei)−D(E) + αC
}
, subject to
L∑
i=1
(πi(ei)− tei − ci) ≥ Y.
As in Finkelsthain and Kislev (1997), the problem in which the constraint binds is ana-
lyzed. Thus a necessary condition for a maximum is
N∑
i=1
π′i(ei)
dei
dt
−D′(E)
dE
dt
+ α
(
L∑
i=1
(
π′i(ei)
dei
dt
− ei − t
dei
dt
))
= 0. (4)
Let EL denote the aggregate emissions of the firms that participate in the lobby group.
Given the optimal behavior of the firms (equation (3)), the emission tax satisfies equation
t−D′(E) =
αtE
L
E
EltE
< 0, (5)
where EltE is the elasticity of aggregate emissions with respect to an emission tax.
The tax rate is set below the marginal damages and differs from the first-best emis-
sion price level. These are well-known results from Finkelsthain and Kislev (1997).9
Finkelsthain and Kislev (1997) compare an emission tax with non-tradable quantities,
6Time index τ is dropped for now, because it only clutters the notation. However, it is still used at
some places to avoid possible confusion.
7Lobby formation is exogenous as it is also in Grossman and Helpman (1994).
8It is assumed that the regulator does not discount.
9Regarding the first stage lobby contributions, the lobbying firms capture all the surplus, since there
is only one lobby group (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Finkelsthain and Kislev, 1997).
but this study is interested in auctioned permits. When auctioning the permits, the
number of permits auctioned is set such that
p−D′(E) = α
L∑
i=1
dp
dE0
ei =
αpE
L
E
ElpE
. (6)
Note that the emission prices are equal with either instrument, when no perturbation
occurs in the permit market at the third stage. This implies that the welfare levels are
the same with the instruments. However, according to Assumption 1, if a perturbation
occurs in the permit market, the equilibrium permit price diverges from the emission tax.
This may change the welfare ordering of the instruments. The following assumption is
used to obtain a clear-cut welfare ordering. Define first function Zτ : P → R with
Zτ (p) =
N∑
i=1
πi(e
τ
i (p))−D
(
N∑
i=1
eτi (p)
)
. (7)
This function measures the aggregate social welfare at period τ .10
Assumption 2.
(i) Function Zτ is strictly concave.
(ii) The perturbed price can obtain either value p < t or value p > t with |t−p| = |t−p|.
(iii) The number of perturbations in either direction are the same.
It is easily verified that Zτ is strictly concave for example when the marginal profit
functions are linear functions. Parts (ii) and (iii) include an important special case, in
which an unregulated firm buys permits in some period and later sells them in some other
period. The main result is the following:
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If a perturbation occurs in the
permit market at least in one period of time, then the aggregate welfare under an emission
tax is strictly greater than under auctioned permits.
Proof. Define A = {τ ∈ {1, . . . , T} | θτ 6= θ∗,τ}, that is, A consists of all the periods with
perturbed prices. Set A is non-empty by assumption. Let the number of elements in A be
m. For all periods τ /∈ A, the welfare difference between the emission tax and emissions
trading is zero, because by equations (5) and (6) p = t. Define function K : Pm → R
with
K(p1, . . . , pm) =
∑
τ∈A
Zτ (p
τ ), (8)
where pτ means the price at period τ . This function measures the aggregate welfare
over the periods with perturbed prices. Let pθ = (p
1
θ1
, . . . , pmθm) be the perturbed price
vector and g be an m-vector (t, . . . , t). Note that K(pθ)−K(g) measures then the welfare
difference between the instruments. Since K is a strictly concave function,
K(pθ)−K(g) < ∇K(g)(pθ − g). (9)
Denote by K ′τ the partial derivative with respect to variable number τ , τ = 1, . . . ,m.
10Note that the function Zτ is not necessarily concave.
It is shown that the right-side of (9) is zero. To this end, define A− as the subset of A
that includes all periods with p < t, and A+ as the subset of A that includes all periods
with p > t. Since by Assumption 2 the number of perturbations in either of the directions
is the same, #A− = #A+ and A = A− ∪A+. This allows to rewrite the right-side of (9)
as
∇K(g)(pθ − g) =
∑
τ∈A
K ′τ (t)(p
τ
θτ − t) (10)
=
∑
τ∈A+
K ′τ (t)(p− t) +
∑
τ∈A−
K ′τ (t)(p− t). (11)
This equals zero, since p − t = −(p − t) by Assumption 2. Hence
∑
τ∈A Zτ (t) >∑
τ∈A Zτ (p
τ
θτ ).
The result is intuitive. Although some perturbations push the equilibrium in the
permit market towards the price and aggregate emissions that maximize the social welfare,
the same number of perturbations push the equilibrium away from aggregate emissions
under an emission tax. The latter perturbations have more bearing on the value of
welfare than do the former ones due to the strict concavity of the social welfare function.
Proposition 1 focused on perturbations that can result in only two different prices. In
Appendix A.1, a similar situation is analyzed in which perturbed prices can assume
multiple values and the same result is obtained.
4 Discussion
This paper studied perturbations stemming, for example, from the trading of unregulated
participants in the permit market and found that with these perturbations, emissions
trading is welfare inferior to an emission tax, when instrument is chosen through a political
process that allows firms to lobby the regulator. However, to obtain this result, the
perturbations were constrained in a way that they yield symmetric prices around the
emissions tax. It should be noted that without Assumption 2, welfare can just as well be
greater with emissions trading than with an emissions tax. For example, if perturbations
result in permit prices that only lower the aggregate emissions such that they fall between
the first-best values and emissions under an emission tax, emissions trading yields greater
welfare. This could be the case, when for example an NGO buys permits with the aim
to keep the permits in order to lower the level of total emissions and hence the level of
damages.
The model can be compared to the “prices versus quantities”-literature. There, uncer-
tainty stemming for example from uncertain final product demand affects both instru-
ments and the demand of emissions, but yields different impacts on the aggregate social
welfare. In the current model, the perturbations affect not the demand of emissions (by
the regulated firms) but the market clearing condition, which is a part of the definition
for the equilibrium in the permit market. Further work should include a specific analysis
of the incentives for the trades by unregulated participants in the market.
Appendix
A.1 More than two types of perturbations
Define B := {τ1, . . . , τw} as the set of time periods in which perturbations occur. Suppose
that 2 ≤ w ≤ T . (If w = 1, either an emission tax or emissions trading will yield a higher
welfare level depending on the direction of the perturbation.) Define P := {pτ1θτ1 , . . . , p
τw
θτw}
as the set of perturbed prices. The following assumption characterizes set P:
Assumption 3. Let puθu ∈ P for any u ∈ B. There exists an odd number of p ∈ P\{p
u
θu}
such that |p− t| = |puθu − t|.
Denote [puθu ] := {p ∈ P | |p − t| = |p
u
θu − t| for some u ∈ B}. This is an equivalence
class relative to relation ∼ defined on P as p ∼ q iff |p − t| = |q − t| for all p, q ∈ P.
Thus, the union of [puθu ] is P. Note that for every [p
u
θu ] there exists a corresponding set of
periods [u] = {τ ∈ B | |pτθτ − t| = |p− t|, p ∈ [p
u
θu ]}, which form a partition of B.
Assumption 4.
(i)
∑
p∈[pu
θu
](p− t) = 0.
(ii) Function Zτ is strictly concave.
Let the representatives of classes [u] be indexed with index set U .
Proposition 2. If Assumptions 1, 3 and 4 hold, the aggregate welfare is greater with an
emission tax than with auctioned permits.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 1,
K(pθ)−K(g) < ∇K(g)(pθ − g) =
∑
u∈U
∑
τ∈[u]
K ′τ (t) (p
τ
θτ − t) . (A.12)
The right side is zero, since
∑
τ∈[u]K
′
τ (t) (p
τ
θτ − t) = 0 for any class [u] (the proof of this
is the same as the proof of Proposition 1 after replacing A, A+ and A− with [u], [u]+ and
[u]−).
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